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The impact of age on voting behaviour and political outcomes has become an issue of 
increasing political and public interest, particularly in the UK. Registration to vote and 
turnout rates are much lower for the young than the old, and partisan preferences now 
differ sharply by age. The 2017 and 2019 general elections saw unprecedented 
demographic divisions in the electorate between older and younger voters, with those 
over 50 voting overwhelmingly for the Conservative Party, while the under-35s voted in 
large numbers for the Labour Party.1 Pronounced age divisions also marked voter 
preferences for Leave or Remain in the 2016 Brexit referendum: older voters delivered 
the narrow majority to ‘Leave’ the EU against the preference to ‘Remain’ of most younger 
voters.  
Meanwhile, in many advanced capitalist economies, age related inequalities in wealth 
have been growing, while levels of welfare state support for retired people and the 
working-age population have diverged. In the UK, the State Pension and other 
allowances for older people were protected in real terms in the era of austerity after 2010, 
whereas there were significant cuts to child benefits, education maintenance support for 
young people, and the social security entitlements of the working age population. These 
trends have led to interest in the power of the ‘grey vote’ and even claims of 
‘gerontocracy.’ Some analysts and academics have speculated that age may become ‘the 
new class’ in British politics.2  
In this paper, we update a previous analysis3 of the age divide in British politics to 
examine the trends over recent general elections. We revisit our analysis by interacting 
turnout by age with other key variables, such as gender, education, ethnicity and housing 
tenure, before examining how support for the main political parties varies by age. In the 
final section we respond to a tendency to explain away age differences as either simply 
about education or homeownership by interacting age, education and housing tenure to 
create 8 sub-groups of voters. We examine their voting patterns and their policy 
preferences to assess the relative independent weight of each factor in determining the 
main divides of our politics and the possible direction of travel in future elections. We 
conclude with a discussion of how the age divide in UK politics is theorised in the political 
science literature and where it could and should go next. 
Turnout, age and the rise of the ‘grey vote’ 
In common with other developed countries, the population of the UK is ageing as a result 
of increased life expectancy and the demographic bulge caused by the so-called ‘baby 
boomer’ generation. The ageing of the parliamentary electorate has also been 
accompanied by differences in voter registration rates by age, and an increase in the 
proportion of older voters in the eligible voter population because of inward migration to 
the UK in recent decades from the EU and elsewhere of young people who are not 
entitled to vote in general elections.4 Using Labour Force Survey (LFS) data, we find that 
in 2017, over 55s were 38% of the resident adult population but 39.9% of the electorate 
and over 65s, 23% and 24.5%, respectively.5 
The growing relative weight of older people in the voting-age population is coupled with 
considerable inequalities in voter turnout by age. A large age difference in turnout first 
opened up in the mid 1990s, and it has persisted in recent general elections.  Figure 1 
shows the probabilty of turnout by age for UK general elections since 1992. 
 
 
Figure 1: Probability of turnout by age group, 1992 – 2019, with 95% confidence intervals 
(Source: British Election Study) 
Despite a narrowing of the gap in turnout between younger and older voters at the 2010 
general election, significant differences in turnout can be observed throughout the 
period from 1997 onwards. Although there was speculation that the Labour Party 
benefited from a ‘youthquake’ at the 2017 general election, studies have suggested that 
there was no substantial change in turnout by age between the 2015 and 2017 elections.6 
At the 2019 general election, turnout amongst young and younger middle-aged voters 
increased compared to 2017, and conversely fell somewhat for older voters, yet age 
differences in voting were still marked. Table 1 below gives estimates of turnout by age 
for Great Britain at the 2019 election using the 2019 British Election Study (BES) Post-
Election Random Probability Survey.7 
 
Table 1: Great Britain (NI excluded): 2019 General Election (Random probability survey8 N= 
3946)  
 
Turnout by age 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
53.6% 62.6% 71.8% 77% 
 
In our previous analysis of the 2017 election,9 we pointed out that the correlation between 
official turnout and age at the constituency-level was weaker than the correlation 
between the quasi-registration rate and age. We calculated the quasi-registration rate 
by dividing the number of registered voters in a constituency by the estimated adult 
population in the constituency using ONS experimental data. This therefore includes both 
those who are not registered due to inaction or choice and those who are not registered 
because they are not entitled to vote. We replicated this for 2019 and found the same 
pattern, albeit with a less pronounced difference. Figure 2 shows a moderate negative 
correlation (-0.392) between official turnout rates and the proportion of young people in 
a constituency, while Figure 3 shows a strong negative correlation (-0.700) between 
quasi-registration rates and the proportion of young people. 
 
Figure 2: The relationship between official turnout rates in a constituency and the proportion of 
18-34 year olds as a percentage of the adult population 
 
Figure 3: The relationship between the number of registered voters in a constituency as a 
percentage of the adult population and the proportion of 18-34 year olds. 
We can also look at how age interacts with housing tenure, education levels, gender and 
ethnicity in the probability of turning out to vote. Housing tenure, education and ethnicity 
correlate strongly with age: older people are more likely to own their home and less likely 
to have gone to university and have a BAME background. The interactions thus help to 
disentangle some of the different effects. Figures 4-7 show the interactions across 
multiple elections using a binary indicator of age (18-54 & 55+), while Figures A1-4 in the 
Appendix show the interactions for the 2019 election using a continuous measure of age. 
Figure 4 shows that both housing tenure and age have an independent effect on the 
likelihood to turnout: homeowners are consistently more likely to vote than those in 
rented accommodation whatever their age, and turnout rates for both homeowners and 
renters increase with age across all elections from 1992-2019. From 1997-2005, the 
turnout of older renters surpassed that of younger homeowners, while since 2010 
younger homeowners have been at least marginally more likely to turnout than older 
renters. Broadly, both of these groups have voted at relatively similar rates to older 
homeowners as compared to younger renters whose turnout has remained by far the 
lowest amongst all groups. Yet, at the 2019 election, there was a noticeable fall in turnout 
amongst older renters, to below 60%. The longer-term trend of lower turnout among 
older renters could be a compositional effect, in that they are a smaller and smaller 
minority within their cohort (a factor we return to later), but the sizeable shift from 2017 
to 2019 would suggest something more specific and perhaps short-term. Nevertheless, 
the evidence now points to homeownership being a more important factor in determining 
turnout than age (see also Figure A1 in Appendix). 
 
Figure 4: Probability of turnout by age and housing tenure, 1992 – 2019 (Source: British Election 
Study) 
We find a similar relationship between age, education and the probability of voting. Figure 
5 shows that, at every age, those with degrees are more likely to vote than non-
graduates. The lowest levels of turnout are amongst young voters with lower levels of 
educational attainment. However, as with older renters, we see a decline in the turnout 
of older non-graduates between the 2017 and 2019 general elections so that younger 
graduates were more likely to vote than older non-graduates for the first time. Figure A2 
in the Appendix shows the results for age and education, dividing non-graduates into 
those with A-levels or equivalent and those GCSEs or lower, for the 2019 general 
election.  
 
Figure 5: Probability of turnout by age and education, 2005 - 2019 (Source: British Election 
Study) 
In contrast to housing tenure and education, there have been very limited gender 
differences in turnout by age in recent elections. Figure 6 shows the probability of turnout 
by gender and age from 1992 to 2019. Other than in 1992, 1997 and 2005 when younger 
women were statistically more likely to turnout than younger men, there were no other 
gender-related differences in turnout for either age group prior to 2019. However, the 
2019 general election marked the first time that men were statistically more likely to vote 
than women, primarily due to the greater turnout of younger men (see also Figure A3). 
 
Figure 6: Probability of turnout by age and gender, 1992 – 2019 (Source: British Election Study). 
Finally, Figure 7 shows that while ethnicity explains turnout to an extent, in that white 
people are more likely to vote, this is dwarfed by the differences in voting by age within 
the BAME groups of voters. In the 2019 election, there was not a significantly difference 
between older white and BAME voters in their propensity to vote, although this was 
largely due to the smaller sample of older BAME voters leading to a less precise estimate 
(see Figure A4 in Appendix). The largest difference by ethnicity within an age group was 
in 2010, when younger BAME voters were particularly unlikely to vote (c.50%) vis-à-vis 
younger white voters (c.70%). 
 
Figure 7: Probability of turnout by age and ethnicity, 2001 – 2019 (Source: British Election 
Study). 
Scotland and Wales 
Motivated by the question of whether the supply-side of politics can help to explain these 
differences, we explore turnout at the sub-national level as well. Inequalities in turnout 
by age have also been clearly visible in elections in Scotland and Wales in recent years. 
Figure 8 shows turnout by age in the Scottish independence referendum in 2014, at 
subsequent Scottish and UK Parliamentary elections, and at the Brexit referendum. The 
independence referendum witnessed significantly higher levels of democratic 
participation in Scotland than at any other recent election or referendum. A very high 
figure of 84.6% of the registered electorate voted in the independence referendum (and 
some 109,593 16- and 17-year-olds were newly registered to vote). Participation at 
subsequent elections has been lower and was lowest for young people (18-34 years old) 
at the 2016 Scottish Parliament elections. The age gap narrowed at the 2019 general 




Figure 8: Turnout by age groups, elections and referenda in Scotland, 2014 -2019 (Source: 
British Election Study Internet Panel Survey, authors’ own weighting10) 
 
In Wales, similar patterns emerge over recent years – a marked age gap in probability of 
turnout, with the lowest turnout figures recorded for the 2016 Welsh Assembly elections, 
followed by a narrowing of age differences at the 2019 general election. 
 
 
Figure 9: Probability of turnout by age groups in Wales, 2014 – 2019 (Source: British Election 
Study Internet Panel Survey, authors’ own weightings) 
 
Interestingly, while the probability of being satisfied with democracy demonstrates 
similar age differences as turnout at elections at the level of the UK as a whole – older 
voters being more satisfied (Figure 10) – the young and middle aged express greater 
satisfaction with Scottish democracy than older age groups (Figure 11), which may reflect 
attitudes towards devolution but are not evident in higher turnout. The picture for Wales 
is a mixed one (see Figure A5), again suggesting satisfaction with democracy is not the 
explanation of turnout differences. 
 
 
Figure 10: Probability of being satisfied with UK democracy by age group (Source: British 




Figure 11: Probability of being satisfied with Scottish democracy by age group (Source: British 
Election Study Internet Panel Survey) 
 
 
Age, political preferences and vote choice 
 
The electoral power of older voters is only likely to be significant if their political 
preferences and vote choices differ substantially from the rest of the electorate. Recent 
evidence suggests this is indeed the case. In the Brexit referendum, and the 2017 and 
2019 general elections, there were very considerable differences in preferences 
according to age.  
 
Figure 12 shows the probability of voting Conservative by age group since 1992. The gap 
in voting Conservative by age starts to widen in 2001 and is considerable in 2017. Figure 
13 shows the same probability of voting Labour by age. Both figures show that 2019 was, 
to a large extent, a continuation of the age divide found in 2017. However, one of the 
most striking shifts from 2017 to 2019 is among 50-64 year olds, the only age group for 
which there is a significant increase in voting Conservative and the age group with the 










Figure 13: Probability of voting Labour by age group, 1992 - 2019 (Source: British Election Study) 
 
Using British Election Study (BES) data, Tables 2 and 3 show how each age group voted 
in the Brexit referendum and the 2017 general election respectively. Table 4 analyses 
age and party choice for the 2019 election, using the 2019 British Election Study (BES) 
Post- Random Probability Survey. 
 
Table 2: EU referendum vote by age group (n=1695; non-voters excluded; demographic 
weights) 
EU referendum 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ Total 
Remain 66.9% 50.1% 43.5% 37.9% 49.5% 
Leave 33.1% 49.9% 56.6% 62.1% 50.5% 
 
Table 3: 2017 general election vote by age group (n=1616; non-voters excluded; self-reported 
vote weights) 
2017 vote 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ Total 
Labour 60.0% 45.8% 40.3% 26.3% 41.0% 
Conservatives 26.7% 35.7% 41.2% 62.1% 43.5% 
Lib Dems 7.5% 10.5% 7.8% 5.4% 7.6% 
Other 5.8% 8.1% 10.7% 6.3% 7.9% 
 
Table 4: 2019 general election vote by age group (Random probability survey11 N= 3946)  
2019 vote 18-34 35-49 50-64 65+ 
Conservatives 26.3% 36.3% 50.4% 59.2% 
Labour 53.4% 38.2% 26.4% 20.3% 
Lib Dems 11.1% 13.0% 11.5% 11.9% 
SNP 3.7% 6.4% 4.0% 2.3% 
Plaid Cymru 0.4% 0.9% 0.5% 0.3% 
Green 3.2% 3.0% 3.4% 1.7% 
Brexit 1.5% 0.9% 2.3% 3.1% 
Other / DK 0.4% 1.2% 1.5% 1.3% 
 
Explaining the age divide – ‘cultural backlash’ and identity groups 
While age has long been an important factor in British politics, the 2017 general election 
marked an unprecedented level of polarisation. There is an obvious hypothesis for this, 
which is that 2017 was a ‘Brexit election’ – an issue on which, as we have seen, voters 
are also deeply polarised by age.12  Support for the Conservative Party rose markedly 
amongst older Leave voters, assisted by the collapse of UKIP support, while Labour 
increased its vote share amongst working age Remain voters significantly more than it 
did amongst Leave voters.13 This pattern was repeated at the 2019 general election: 80% 
of Conservative voters were Leave supporters in 2019, while a similar proportion of 
Labour voters were Remain supporters.14 
It is the importance of the Brexit cleavage that leads many to explain age differences in 
voting by reference to a “cultural backlash” – the title of an important recent work by 
Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris.15 The cultural backlash thesis maintains that recent 
‘populist’ votes such as Brexit and the election of Donald Trump in 2016, represent a 
conservative reaction against the ‘silent revolution’ in the cultural values of advanced 
societies like the UK towards social liberalism. Western societies have become more 
socially liberal on many issues and this has stimulated a backlash amongst voters holding 
authoritarian and conservative values. These values are strongest amongst older birth 
cohorts, particularly the interwar generation. In post-industrial areas characterised by 
low income and high unemployment, the authoritarian reflex against cultural change is 
accelerated by economic insecurity; material hardship sharpens the appeal of 
authoritarian-populist actors and anti-immigrant, anti-elite sentiments. But 
fundamentally, it is cultural values, not class or economics that explains the age 
differences in vote choice. 
A similar account is given by Maria Sobolewska and Robert Ford in their recent work.16 
Sobolewska and Ford argue that generational differences in values, identities and 
political preferences have arisen from two key social trends in the UK. First, educational 
expansion has opened up universities, formerly the preserve of an elite, to mass 
participation, driving up the proportion of young and middle-aged voters who have gone 
into higher education. Second, migration and ethnic pluralisation in recent decades have 
significantly increased Britain’s ethnic and cultural diversity. The combined effect of 
these two trends, Ford and Sobolewksa argue, is to have transformed the typical 
experience of a young person growing up in Britain. Most citizens growing up in the 1950s 
did not go to university and had little or no contact with people from different ethnic or 
religious backgrounds. In contrast, young people growing up in the 21st century live in a 
society where ethnic and religious diversity are taken for granted and university is an 
experience enjoyed by the majority of their peers. The generational structure of both 
these changes, and hence of the identities and values associated with them, drives a 
growing divide between younger ‘identity liberals’ and older ‘identity conservatives.’ The 
latter embrace an ethnocentric worldview, rejecting ethnic diversity and resenting the 
loss of cultural conformity and continuity which once gave them a dominant status. 
Furthermore, the geographical distribution of different demographic groups – of young, 
well-educated and diverse populations who live in cities and university towns, and older, 
predominantly white and lower skilled populations living in post-industrial towns and 
coastal areas - adds to the electoral polarisation between identity groups ‘who not only 
think differently, but also increasingly live apart from each other’.17  
Importantly, Sobolewska and Ford do not argue that ‘demography is destiny.’ The political 
consequences of these demographic trends are contingent. Demographic shifts ‘change 
the electoral resources available to parties and open up the potential for new political 
conflicts to emerge’ but do not determine the choices political parties make.’ Different 
political responses to the same demographic trends can lead towards divergent political 
outcomes, as illustrated by the very different ways demographic divides and identity 
conflicts have been mobilised in Scotland compared to England and Wales.18  
As Figures 14-15 show, education, as a potential driver of value conflicts, has not been a 
consistent divide in voting. While the long-term trend of graduates shifting from right to 
left and non-graduates from left to right is striking and replicated across most advanced 
democracies19, as recently as the 2015 and 2017 elections there were mostly insignificant 
differences between graduates and non-graduates within age groups in their propensity 
to vote Conservative or Labour (only older non-graduates were more likely to vote 
Conservatives than older graduates in 2017). Thus, the extent of the education divide in 
2019 stands out and points to the importance of election-specific ‘supply side’ factors. 
 
Figure 14: Probability of voting Conservative by age group (18-54; 55+) and education 
(graduate; non-graduate) 1992-2019 
 
 
Figure 15: Probability of voting Labour by age group (18-54; 55+) and education (graduate; non-
graduate) 1992-2019 
This theme of how the ‘supply side’ of electoral politics shapes the relationship between 
values, social class and age is taken up in a recent working paper by Leo Azzolini and 
Geoffrey Evans.20 In this paper, Azzolini and Evans argue that ideological convergence 
between the main political parties on economic and social liberal positions 
disproportionately depresses the turnout of the working class, and the class of self-
employed and small business owners. Consensus between the major parties is 
associated with declining turnout among citizens in these social classes who hold 
economically left-wing and socially authoritarian values that are not given expression in 
mainstream politics. This ‘class gap’ in turnout interacts with an ‘age gap’: divisions in 
turnout between classes are primarily found amongst younger voters who are less 
socialised or integrated into the political system. Turnout is depressed among younger 
cohorts for the authoritarian self-employed, and even more so amongst the economically 
left-wing and authoritarian working class. 
Azzolini and Evans argue that their findings demonstrate that ideological convergence 
acts as ‘a powerful vehicle of political inequality: on one hand, it drives gaps in turnout 
between young individuals across social classes by up to 20%. In this case, social 
stratification extends to political participation, depressing the participation of one of the 
most disadvantaged sections of British society. On the other hand, it drives gaps in 
turnout between young and old individuals, with this gap reaching up to 50% within the 
working class. Considering age-class groups separately, under ideological convergence 
young members of the working class are a staggering 55% less likely to vote than older 
members of the middle class.’21 
Economic geography, wealth and assets  
In contrast to these accounts, political economy explanations of age divides in values 
and political preferences place the transition to the digitalised knowledge economy at 
the heart of new ‘cultural’ political divisions. Torben Iversen and David Soskice argue that 
advanced capitalism’s primary asset is specialised knowledge, which is embedded in the 
social networks of co-located, highly educated, and relatively immobile skill clusters.22 
The process of skill agglomeration in post-industrial economies means that urban centres 
which attract young, well-educated people expand and thrive, while towns and rural 
areas that are disproportionately old and lower skilled fall behind. This leads to the 
emergence of distinct winners and losers, formed along geographical, age and 
educational cleavages: the winners are the young, educated workers in the urban 
knowledge economy, while the losers are older, lower skilled workers of the post-
industrial towns and counties. Authoritarian cultural values of the older population derive 
from this economic reality, as do the liberal, permissive views of younger people: 
“‘postmaterialists’ and ‘populists’ are ‘rooted in different parts of the modern economy 
and it is impossible to detach their values from this underlying reality”.23 
A similar approach is taken by Will Jennings & Gerry Stoker who relate the economic 
decline of English and Welsh constituencies to a long-term shift towards voting 
Conservative. Places that have experienced relative decline have become more ‘closed’, 
while those that have enjoyed growth in the knowledge economy have become more 
liberal and ‘open’. The Conservatives have seen their vote share rise in the former; Labour 
in the latter.24 
These accounts usefully reject unhelpful dichotomies between ‘culture’ and ‘economics.’ 
But as they ground cultural values and political preferences in the material interests, 
occupations and economic geography produced by the transition from the industrial or 
Fordist economy to the knowledge economy, they tend to associate older voters with 
‘left behind’ areas and/or industrial occupations. Yet this is hard to reconcile with the 
substantial evidence of the relative economic prosperity of older voters in the UK: their 
historically high levels of housing and pension wealth, and the increase in their living 
standards in recent decades, particularly when compared to younger people in the period 
since the financial crisis in 2008.25  
Recent work by Jane Green and Raluca L. Pahontu on the relationship between wealth, 
risk aversion and preparedness to support change in the status quo offers important 
insights into this issue.26 Green and Pahontu study the relationship between household 
wealth and voting for Leave or Remain in the Brexit referendum. They argue that holding 
wealth, particularly in the form of home ownership, insures against risk and provides 
economic security, enabling the wealthy to support changes to the status quo, such as 
Brexit, in the belief that they are insulated from its economic consequences. Conversely, 
those lacking wealth cannot so readily support their preferences if these entail changes 
to the status quo against which they are not insured. Green and Pahontu argue that, 
‘…variation in personal wealth enables wealthier individuals to support Brexit, and less 
wealthy individuals to support Remain. We provide evidence that the mechanism linking 
wealth and higher Leave support is via wealthy voters’ expectation that Brexit would not 
impact their personal finances, and we show that an increase in wealth lowers risk-
aversion…Wealth insures against the risks associated with a change to the status quo. 
This means that while many poorer individuals may have held a preference for Leave, 
they were less likely to vote for Brexit given their lack of economic insurance.’27 
Housing, home ownership and age  
These results suggest that we need to develop a fuller political economy explanation of 
the age divides in the electorate and, in particular, the interests of older voters in their 
economic security. In the rest of this paper, we focus on one aspect of this question: 
housing wealth. Cohort effects in the accumulation of housing wealth have led to very 
high rates of home ownership – above 75% - amongst the current generation of over 
‘65s. In economic policy preferences, this may predispose older people to vote for parties 
that they perceive will protect the value of housing assets in the economy, leave untaxed 
their housing wealth, or allow them to express other policy preferences, such as on 
immigration, in the belief that their wealth will insure them against risks. We might then 
expect to see social class differences emerge in the preferences of older voters 
depending on whether they rent or own their own properties.  
In their recent study of the relationship between house prices, housing markets and vote 
choice, Ansell and Adler find a strong correlation between home ownership, age and 
voting Conservative at the 2017 general election: ‘whereas among renters (in private and 
social housing) age is essentially unrelated to vote choice, among homeowners there is 
a striking difference of around 30 per cent as we move from people in their twenties to 
people in their eighties’.28 The authors explain the fact that age increases the likelihood 
of voting Conservative for homeowners by pointing to the varying levels of equity that 
individuals will have at different points in their life. Older people are more likely to own a 
large share of their property or own it outright. They have more housing wealth than 
young people and less risk of negative equity.      
Figure 16 shows the relationship between voting Conservative and age/housing tenure 
since 1992. Older homeowners are consistently more likely to vote Conservative. At the 
2019 general election, for the first time, older renters were more likely to vote 
Conservative than younger (18-54) owners – reflecting the shift away from Labour 
amongst older voters in so-called ‘Red Wall’ seats. 
Figure 16: Probability of voting Conservative by age group (18-54; 55+) and housing tenure 
(owner; renter) 1992-2019 
However, the relative size of homeowners and renters in different age cohorts has 
changed considerably in recent decades. Using data compiled by the Resolution 
Foundation from the Family Expenditure Survey prior to 1984, and Labour Force Survey 
for subsequent years, we can show homeownership rates for different age groups 
between 1961 and 2017. Figure 17 shows that the proportion of over 65s who are 
homeowners has increased continually since 1970. It now stands at over 75%. 
 
Figure 17: Home-ownership rates by age group of household (25-34; 35-44; 45-54; 55-64; 
65+). Source: Resolution Foundation, FES 1961-1983, LFS 1984-2017 
This is largely driven by generational differences: baby boomers were able to get on the 
housing ladder and buy housing cheaply in their youth, amassing housing wealth during 
the long asset boom that started in the 1970s.  
Age, tenure and education: an interactive approach to voting and non-voting 
We can probe the relationship between older people’s voting preferences, 
homeownership and education more fully by adopting a novel approach of interacting 
age, housing tenure and education to develop clusters of voters according to the 
following 8 sub-groups:  
(1) Older (55+), non-graduate, renters 
(2) Older (55+), graduate, renters 
(3) Younger (18-54), non-graduate, renters 
(4) Younger (18-54), graduate, renters 
(5) Older (55+), non-graduate, homeowners 
(6) Older (55+), graduate, homeowners 
(7) Younger (18-54), non-graduate, homeowners 
(8) Younger (18-54), graduate, homeowners 
Note: “renters” is short-hand for anyone that doesn’t own the home they live in, so 
includes those living with family and friends. 
Starting with voters only, Figure 18 shows that for all sub-groups where 2 of the 3 socio-
demographic factors are “Tory-friendly”, a majority or plurality of voters backed the 
Conservatives, while 63% of older, owner, non-graduates voted Conservative.  The same 
applies for Labour (with 54% of younger, renter, graduates voting Labour), other than 
older renter graduates, 41% of whom voted Conservative. However, this sub-group 
represents <1% of voters. 
 
Figure 18: Share of votes for the major parties at 2019 general election by age-education-tenure 
sub-group, excluding non-voters (Source: British Election Study random probability survey 2019) 
However, looking at the 2017 election in Figure 19, we can see that only 4 years ago 
Labour got a majority or plurality of nearly every sub-group other than older homeowners. 
Thus, the 2019 election saw a collapse of Labour’s support among non-graduates 
regardless of age and housing tenure. Interestingly, the fact that the Conservative still 
won in 2017 also highlights why examining voting in this way is a partial story. This can 
be explained by at least two important factors: the absolute size of each sub-group and 
non-voting or turnout. 
 
Figure 19: Share of votes for the major parties at 2017 general election by age-education-tenure 
sub-group, excluding non-voters (Source: British Election Study random probability survey 2017) 
First, the inclusion of non-voting in Figure 20 transforms the picture. Nearly 50% of 
Labour’s "core" constituency (younger renting graduates) did not vote in 2019 while non-
voting was even higher for young non-graduate renters (58%). This means that younger 
homeowning graduates were the sub-group most likely to vote Labour. 
 
 
Figure 20: Share of votes for the major parties and non-voting at 2019 general election by age-
education-tenure sub-group (Source: British Election Study random probability survey 2019) 
Comparing these figures to 2017, we can see that some of the shifts in voting patterns 
can be explained by turnout rather than Labour-Tory switchers. The drop from 35% of 
older (non-graduate) renters voting Labour to 16% is mostly the result of an increase in 
non-voting from 31% to 48%. 
 
Figure 21: Share of votes for the major parties and non-voting at 2017 general election by age-
education-tenure sub-group (Source: British Election Study random probability survey 2017) 
To account for the absolute size of each sub-group, we can also look at the share of 
Labour voters as a percentage of all voters from 1992-2019. Figure 22 shows that 
graduates have been gradually replacing non-graduates in Labour’s electoral coalition 
but still represent a minority of Labour voters. The different sub-groups look more evenly 
split when viewed through this lens, although again, younger homeowning graduates 
comprise the most significant sub-group of Labour voters.  
On the other hand, the caricature of Labour voters as younger, university-educated 
renters is a considerable exaggeration of their size in the population and tendency to 
turnout – roughly 3% of (all) voters fitted this description in 2019. The decline of older 
renters as a part of the Labour coalition – both due to socio-demographic change and 
voting patterns – is also noticeable as a long-term trend. 
 
Figure 22: Labour vote share at general elections 1992-2019 broken down into age-education-
tenure sub-groups (Source: British Election Study random probability surveys) 
Meanwhile, Figure 23 shows the changing shape of the Conservative coalition over this 
time. Interestingly, the home-owning baby boomers who propelled John Major to victory 
in 1992 (when they were under 55) are now the bedrock of the Tory coalition as they 
age. Their size and significance are such that in 2017, just under half of the Conservative 
Party’s voters were homeowners over the age of 55 without degrees. 
 
 
Figure 23: Conservative vote share at general elections 1992-2019 broken down into age-
education-tenure sub-groups (Source: British Election Study random probability surveys) 
To examine the underlying preferences that could be driving these voting patterns on 
the demand-side, we use a battery of British Election Study left-right questions for 2019 
to create a mean left-right/authoritarian-libertarian position for each age-education-
tenure sub-group. Figure A6 provides an indication of the left-right & libertarian-
authoritarian variables used.29  
Figure 24 shows the position of the 8 sub-groups on a 2-dimensional axis combining 
economic and social/cultural preferences. Firstly, the assumed core Labour vote is 
unsurprisingly young graduates who are left-libertarian (bottom left quadrant). The 
assumed core Conservative vote based on these preferences would be (young and old) 
owner non-graduates, who are right-authoritarian (top right). The Labour core is as 
expected based on voting patterns but the inclusion of younger homeowning non-
graduates in the Conservative core is less in tune with recent voting patterns.  
Meanwhile, cross-pressured groups are (young and old) non-graduate renters as left-
authoritarian (top left) and older graduates as right-libertarian (bottom right). Younger 
sub-groups are consistently more socially/culturally libertarian and economically left-
wing than their equivalent older sub-group, although younger and older non-graduate 
renters have indistinguishable positions on the economic left-right scale. As argued 
above, key imbalances for Labour are demographics and non-voting. The top right Tory-
friendly quadrant, owner non-graduates, make up c.48% of voters, while the bottom left 




Figure 24: Two-dimensional axis showing the economic and social/cultural positioning of voters 
by age-education-tenure sub-groups 
This 2-dimensional approach is stylised to tell a simple story about a complicated set of 
values/preferences that voters might have. However, sometimes this complexity matters, 
and the survey items we use may seem a little dated for contemporary political fault lines. 
Thus, we can also focus in on specific survey questions in British Election Study surveys 
to see how this changes the divides by sub-group. 
While abstract questions on redistribution mirror the distribution of economic left-right 
preferences seen in the 2-dimensional axis (see Figure A7), when redistribution is framed 
in terms of increased tax and social spending, older homeowners are very supportive. 
Figure 25 shows that older homeowners are most likely to want to increase taxes and 
spend more. A simple explanation would be that this is because they do not expect to 
pay much of the tax and rely more on the types of services the state increasingly 
provides. But it also points to an explanation of why the current Conservative government 
is presiding over tax rises and spending commitments, beyond a simple ‘shift to the left’ 
narrative. These voters are not ostensibly left-wing on most issues but they do support 
public services and are not averse to tax rises where they expect them to land: on 
working-age people. 
 
Figure 25: Tax and spend preferences by age-education-tenure sub group (Source: British 
Election Study random probability survey 2019) 
On the other hand, echoing research that suggests the politics of welfare and 
conditionality reflects the cultural dimension as much as economics30, scepticism about 
welfare seems best explained by educational divides rather than housing tenure or age. 
Figure 26 shows attitudes to the idea that welfare is too generous. The contrast between 
younger homeowners depending on whether they are graduates or not is striking. 
 
 
Figure 26: Welfare attitudes by age-education-tenure sub group (Source: British Election Study 
random probability survey 2019) 
As the British Election Study battery of items for the social/cultural dimension does not 
include a question on immigration, we examine these in Figure 27, which shows whether 
respondents thought immigration was good or bad for the economy. Again, education is 
the most important predictor of these attitudes, even if those most likely to have negative 
rather than positive attitudes to immigration are older non-graduate renters.  
 
 
Figure 27: Immigration attitudes by age-education-tenure sub group (Source: British Election 
Study random probability survey 2019) 
Finally, we examine attitudes to the trade-off between environmental protection and 
economic growth. Figure 28 shows a surprisingly low level of polarisation on this issue 




Figure 28: Environment vs. growth attitudes by age-education-tenure sub group (Source: British 
Election Study random probability survey 2019) 
Conclusion: towards a political economy of older voters and the age divide 
In much of the analysis of the Brexit referendum and the 2017 and 2019 general elections, 
the votes of older people have been considered largely reactionary, as an expression 
either of socially conservative values pitted against the liberalism and cosmopolitanism 
of younger voters, or the perspective of places in decline and ‘left behind’. Relatively little 
attention has been paid to whether older voters have distinct interests and political 
preferences by virtue of their position in the lifecycle and/or the material circumstances 
of the particular cohorts to which they belong – and whether the wealth and assets of 
older people help explain the age divide in British politics.  
In the previous sections of this paper, we have explored the material interests of older 
voters, and shown that home-owners aged over 55, who make up over 75% of their age 
cohort, have strong and consistent preferences for voting Conservative. The work of 
Green and Raluca L. Pahontu has similarly demonstrated that wealthier individuals were 
more likely to vote for Brexit. These arguments suggest that we cannot account for the 
age divide in political preferences simply by reference to values divides between the 
generations. Whilst such divides undoubtedly exist, it is important to examine the inter-
relationship of identities and values with economic and social class formations. 
Evidence from the Bank of England, as well as research institutes such as the Institute 
for Fiscal Studies and the Resolution Foundation, has found that older people have 
benefited disproportionately from both monetary and fiscal policy in the post-financial 
crisis era.31. Older homeowners have seen their housing and pension wealth increase as 
a result of Quantitative Easing, while the austerity enacted by the Coalition and 
Conservative governments gave relative protection to the social security entitlements 
enjoyed by older people at the expense of those of the working age population. Despite 
the devastating effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on the health of older people, these 
patterns of relative economic disadvantage for the young – particularly those from 
working class backgrounds - look set to persist. 
At the 2019 General Election, there was a narrowing of the age gap in turnout and a shift 
in support towards the Conservatives by older renters and non-graduates. Turnout 
amongst these two groups also fell, as it did overall for older voters, while that of younger 
voters increased. This suggests that the turnout and voting preferences of older voters, 
in particular, cannot simply be read off from their material interests: preferences for 
Brexit, attitudes towards Labour, and other factors – including a drop off in turnout that 
might be attributable to a winter election – account for the shifts in older people’s voting 
patterns at the 2019 election.  
Nonetheless, while the turbulence of recent political events has created many ‘supply 
side’ explanations for political change – and opened up considerable space in which 
challenger parties can operate – the ‘demand-side’ of voters’ preferences has focused 
too much on the cultural values of older voters and ‘left behind’ places, and not enough 
on the relative prosperity of the older population and the means by which they have 
secured their economic interests since the financial crisis. On this account, political 
inequalities – in registration, turnout and partisan preferences - mean that older voters 
are better able to advance their interests than the young. 
Appendix 
Figure A1: Probability of Voting in 2019 General Election by age and housing tenure (Source: 
2019 BES Post-Election Random Probability Survey) 
Figure A2: Probability of voting in the 2019 General Election by age and education ((Source: 
2019 BES Post-Election Random Probability Survey) 
 
 
Figure A3: Probability of voting in 2019 by age and gender (Source: 2019 BES Post-Election 
Random Probability Survey) 
 
Figure A4: Probability of voting in 2019 by age and ethnicity (Source: 2019 BES Post-Election 
Random Probability Survey) 
 
 
Figure A5: Probability of being satisfied with Welsh democracy by age group (Source: British 
Election Study Internet Panel Survey) 
 
 




Figure A7: Redistribution preferences by age-education-tenure sub group (Source: British 
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